We study physicians' prescription choices when uncertainty about drug efficacy is resolved through two channels: firms' marketing activities (e.g., detailing) and patients' experiences with the drugs. We first provide empirical evidence that suggests the well-understood information incentive for physicians to experiment with new drugs is reduced when physicians anticipate future detailing. Increased detailing activity therefore triggers opposing forces: adoption is hastened as physicians become informed (assuming priors are initially low), and slows as they reduce experimentation and instead obtain information from detailing at no cost. We then estimate a dynamic Bayesian learning model that embodies these trade-offs using physician-level data on prescription choices and detailing received in the months surrounding the introduction of two erectile dysfunction drugs, Levitra and Cialis.
Introduction
Researchers in marketing and economics have studied the impact of firms' marketing activities (e.g., detailing) and feedback from patients on the diffusion of new drugs within and across physicians (see Manchanda et al. 2005) . Given the possibility that physicians might be uncertain about the quality of the new drug, researchers have typically assumed physicians learn about drug quality in a Bayesian fashion with detailing and patient feedback providing the information for such learning (e.g., Currie Why is it important to account for these two aspects when studying new drug diffusion? Forward-looking physicians have a greater incentive to act strategically because of the feedback mechanism. By experimenting early, forward-looking physicians can learn the effectiveness and side effects of new drugs more quickly, knowledge they can apply to other patients. For most ethical drugs (such as those used in the majority of the previous literature that has focused on myopic physician behavior), experimentation seems unlikely given the potentially severe consequences the physician could face, namely malpractice lawsuits. However, this concern is mitigated in the case of lifestyle drugs such as the one we consider in this paper. In our setting, a forward-looking physician trades off lower current utility from prescribing a new drug of uncertain quality with the future option value from having more information about the new drug's true quality. Narayanan, Manchanda, and Chintagunta (2005) and Narayanan and Manchanda (2009) establish that multiple sources of information influence drug diffusion. Although physicians generally do not choose whether they receive detailing visits, they do choose whether to experiment with a new drug to obtain patient feedback. Physicians may therefore strategically substitute between sources of information: experimentation is costly, so a physician will be less likely to experiment if he expects free information to arrive via detailing. Indeed, physicians in our data who have yet to receive detailing are less likely to adopt with early patients the greater the level of their future detailing. Such behavior is consistent with both strategic substitution of feedback information with detailing information and physicians possibly waiting to receive free samples from sales representatives. By modeling physicians as forward-looking, we can investigate the implications of strategic substitution between information sources. Although detailing tends to increase adoption (assuming the information is favorable), an increase in expected detailing can delay adoption by physicians who were initially planning to obtain information via experimentation.
For physicians unlikely to experiment, this substitution effect of expected detailing is reduced. Hence, detailing has a greater impact on physicians who are less likely to obtain information through experimentation. Without capturing this inter-temporal behavior of physicians, a myopic model will likely provide incorrect inferences regarding the effects of detailing, just as previous studies have shown that inferences regarding price effects are incorrect when forward-looking behavior is ignored (e.g., Erdem, Imai, and Keane 2003) .
In this study, we investigate the diffusion of two drugs, Levitra and Cialis, that are launched in the Erectile Dysfunction (ED) category in which the incumbent Viagra had enjoyed monopoly status for more than five years. For our empirical analysis, we use data on physicians' prescription writing and detailing received over 10 months from August 2003 to May 2004. The data provide evidence consistent with physicians being forward-looking and substituting feedback information with detailing information when expected detailing is high. Accordingly, in formulating our model of physicians' learning behavior, we assume physicians are forward-looking and use information from detailing visits as well as from patient feedback to learn about the quality of Cialis and Levitra.
Building on the Bayesian learning framework (Miller 1984 Rust (1987) to estimate the model.
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Our results indicate most physicians initially perceive the new drugs as inferior to Viagra and increase their beliefs as they learn the drugs' true efficacies from detailing and patient feedback. The average true efficacies of the drugs are similar, with Cialis having the highest and Levitra the lowest. We also find high expectations of detailing slow adoption, as expected detailing induces forward-looking physicians to wait for free information or free samples from detailing.
1 Crawford and Shum (2005) observe the sequence of each patient's visits and therefore focus on learning patient-specific match-values. We do not observe patient identities and therefore restrict our model to prescriptions for new ED patients, and focus on learning about a drug's physician-specific average efficacy. Efficacy varies across physicians because of differences in patient-base characteristics.
2 Narayanan and Manchanda (2009) are able to estimate a richer heterogeneity structure given their static setting.
We compute detailing elasticities for the new drugs under three scenarios: with myopic physicians and with forward-looking physicians who either do or do not anticipate the new detailing levels. Elasticities with myopic physicians are more than twice as high as those with forward-looking physicians because myopic physicians with low initial beliefs rarely prescribe the drugs and remain in the low-belief state until detailing informs them.
In contrast, forward-looking physicians are more likely to experiment with the drug to obtain information about a drug's efficacy, which enables them to escape the low-belief state without detailing information. We also find the effect of increased detailing to forward-looking physicians depends on whether they anticipate the change. Detailing elasticities are lower when physicians anticipate changes in detailing because they reduce experimentation in response to higher expected detailing.
Finally, we evaluate the optimality of the level of detailing by Levitra and Cialis in the post-launch months of our data, holding fixed other firms' detailing activity. We find Levitra's observed detailing level maximizes its expected discounted profits if each Levitra prescription during the post-launch period translates into 32 future prescriptions.
For Cialis, observed detailing levels are optimal if each prescription results in 24 future prescriptions.
Industry and Data Overview
Erectile dysfunction (ED) is the inability to achieve or sustain an adequate erection for sexual activity. The first oral ED treatment the FDA approved was Pfizer's Viagra, on March 27, 1998, followed by Bayer and GlaxoSmithKline's Levitra on August 19, 2003, and Eli Lilly's Cialis on November 21, 2003 . All three of these drugs are phosphodiesterase (PDE) inhibitors, which enable erections by enhancing the effects of nitric oxide, a chemical the body produces during sexual stimulation to increase blood flow. Although the basic mechanism is the same, the drugs differ in their chemical makeup. Patients may therefore experience different outcomes across the drugs, such as how quickly they take effect and wear off, how they interact with other medications, and side effects. Notably, Cialis works for 36 hours whereas Levitra and Viagra last up to four hours. As such, Cialis is the only drug offered as a once-daily medication.
Various medical journals report that Viagra, Levitra, and Cialis do not usually cause severe side effects but that some people experience headache, flushing, indigestion, and a runny nose after taking these drugs. A small number of men taking ED drugs have reportedly suffered vision loss or sudden hearing loss. Physicians do not recommend ED drugs to patients who have high or low blood pressure, diabetes, high cholesterol, eye problems, heart pain, or a history of stroke or life-threatening arrhythmia within the last six months. Given these possible complications, all existing drugs in the ED category require a doctor's prescription.
Since the successful launch of Viagra in April 1998, growing public awareness of ED problems has rapidly expanded the ED market. Viagra sales in 1998 were $788 million worldwide, with $656 million in the United States. In 2006, global ED sales exceeded $3 billion.
Data
We obtained physician-level data from ImpactRX, a consulting firm specializing in the pharmaceutical industry. Our panel data set covers 9,900 prescription records written by 957 physicians over the 10-month-period from August 2003 to May 2004. The data set also contains daily detailing records for 4, 819, 6, 936, and 4, 874 sales-force visits from Viagra, Levitra, and Cialis, respectively.
All physicians in our sample are primary-care physicians. We only consider physicians who prescribed Viagra at least once prior to the launch of the new drugs given our assumption that all physicians know Viagra's efficacy. Similar to Narayanan and Manchanda (2009), we focus our attention on new prescriptions. Although we observe returning patients and their prior prescription, we do not observe their full prescription history. Hence, we do not model prescription choice for returning patients. We do, however, account for feedback information obtained by a physician who switches a consumer from one drug to another. That is, we include such signals in the updating of physicians' beliefs even though we do not include prescription outcomes for such switchers in the likelihood function. We assume physicians obtain no additional feedback information from renewal prescriptions. Because firms choose their detailing strategies, one might be concerned about endogeneity. For example, firms might target physicians who have yet to adopt, which could lead to a bias in detailing effectiveness. Our data do not reflect such a strategy. Instead, the firms appear to be following the standard practice of sorting physicians by prescriptions written in the category and using decile-based rules to allocate detailing resources (Manchanda and Chintagunta 2004) . In Figure 4 , we present the average monthly number of each firm's detailing visits during the sample period, broken down by physician segments based on the number of new prescriptions written during the 10 months after Levitra's launch. We compute Cialis's monthly average using only the seven months after its launch. For each drug, detailing frequency monotonically increases in the size of the physician's patient-base. Among the new drugs, Levitra details physicians more heavily than Cialis.
Moreover, even if the total amount of detailing to a physician is endogenous, the timing of the detailing visits is influenced by random components such as the availability of the physician and the sales representative's calling plan, which reflects travel cost considerations.
Suggestive Evidence of Strategic Physician Behavior
We now provide empirical evidence that suggests physicians adapt their behavior to their expectations of future detailing. In particular, reduced-form regressions, reported in Table 1, indicate that physicians who have yet to be visited by a sales representative are less likely to adopt a new drug the higher their expected future detailing activity.
In the first row of regressions, the dependent variable is a dummy variable for whether the physician adopts the new drug (Levitra or Cialis) for the first new ED patient.
The other regressions modify the dependent variable to consider adoption by the second, third, or fourth new ED patient arrivals. The dummy variable "Levitra" accounts for the generally faster adoption of Levitra than Cialis, probably due to the greater similarity of Levitra to the incumbent Viagra.
The regressions condition on physicians not yet having been visited by a Levitra sales representative, for observations pertaining to the adoption of Levitra, and likewise for observations pertaining to the adoption of Cialis. That is, we include in the regressions only physicians who have not received a detail visit from the relevant firm (Levitra or Cialis) prior to the arrival of the X th patient.
We report results both with and without conditioning on the arrival date of the X th patient. Excluding the calendar date could lead to a negative coefficient on the future detailing variable because physicians with high detailing tend to have many patients and therefore will encounter their first patient sooner. Patients arriving shortly after launch may be less likely to receive a new drug because other information transmission mechanisms, such as word-of-mouth, will not have had as much time to boost demand.
We find, however, that "Days to X th Patient" affects the coefficient on future detailing only in the first regression, and the coefficient remains marginally significant. In the other three regressions, the coefficient on this control variable is precisely estimated to be zero and the coefficient on future detailing is significantly negative. The range of the log(1+ future detailing) variable is 3.9, which implies its effect is also economically significant.
The lower adoption by physicians expecting high future detailing, reflects their willingness to wait for information from detailing or the possible free samples, rather than incur costly experimentation to obtain patient feedback or require their patients to pay for the prescriptions. In our dynamic model, we capture this substitution behavior by accounting for physicians' expectations regarding firms' detailing activities.
A Model of Physician Behavior
Consistent with evidence presented in section 2, we assume physicians are forward-looking and update their initially uncertain beliefs about the quality (i.e., true mean efficacy) of Levitra and Cialis for their patient-base using information obtained from detailing visits and patient feedback on prior prescriptions.
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With each patient visit, a physician whose beliefs suggest the best drug for the patient is the incumbent Viagra faces the following trade-off: he can obtain the higher utility from prescribing Viagra or he can obtain a lower expected utility from one of the new drugs while gaining information that will enable him to make better decisions with future patients. The valuation of these two options depends on the rate at which the physician discounts future utility (which depends on his patient-base size) and on his expectations of future detailing about the new drugs. Being forward-looking, physicians choose their prescription-writing policy to maximize the expected discounted flow of utilities from their current and future patients. The discount factor depends on the time between patient arrivals, which in turn is driven by the physician's patient-base size.
Our assumption that physicians derive utility from patients' outcomes is consistent with evidence that physicians' careers and reputations depend on patients' health out- Let Q pj denote the true quality of drug j for the patient base of physician p. The expected flow utility of physician p who prescribes drug j at time t is
whereQ pjt ≡ E(Q pj |I pt ) is the expected quality of drug j for physician p given information I pt , s(n jpt ; α p ) is the persuasive effect from n jpt detailing visits since physician p's previous patient visit, ε pjt is an i.i.d. idiosyncratic preference shock, and v, l, and c refer to Viagra, Levitra, and Cialis, respectively.
We assume price does not affect physicians decisions, as shown by Hellerstein (1998), finds physicians are largely unaware of patients' out-of-pocket expenditures.
In static models of physician behavior, researchers typically include patient characteristics, such as race and age, in the utility function. In principle, one can do the same in dynamic models. However, such characteristics affect not only current utility, but also future utility, thereby requiring physicians to form expectations regarding the distribution of patient characteristics they will encounter later. Since patient characteristics are not central to our research question, we omit them, essentially treating them as components of ε.
Since Viagra had been on the market for five years prior to the start of our analysis,
we assume its quality is known, which impliesQ pvt = Q pv for all p and t. Moreover, we measure the qualities of Levitra and Cialis relative to Viagra's quality by normalizing Q pv = 0 for each physician. We also assume physicians' beliefs of the new drugs' qualities are distributed normal:
is the variance of p's belief at time t.
Exploiting conjugate distributions (DeGroot 1970), we adopt a Bayesian learning process in which physicians resolve their uncertainty regarding the new drug over time. The physician potentially receives signals from two sources: patient feedback after prescribing the drug and informative detailing from sales representatives. We assume both sources provide unbiased information that is distributed normal. 5 Accordingly, let
) denote realizations of the feedback and average detailing signals between periods t and t + 1. A physician choosing action a pt ∈ {v, l, c} at time t will then update his mean beliefs by averaging the realized signals in with his prior mean beliefs:
where I(·) is an indicator function. The variance of physicians' beliefs shrinks to
Conveniently, the posterior variance depends only on the precision of the signals, not on their realized values. A physician's beliefs regarding the new drugs' qualities at time t are fully characterized by the 4-tuple
In our model, social interactions do not influence physicians' learning. Our data do not permit such interactions, nor are they likely to be significant among primary care physicians for whom ED is a small fraction of overall prescriptions. See Nair, Manchanda, and Bhatia (2010) for an analysis of prescription decisions with social interactions.
A unique aspect of our model is that physicians' beliefs regarding firms' future detailing affect current prescription choices, because future detailing affects future utilities, beliefs, and choices and physicians are forward-looking. Consistent with Manchanda and Chintagunta (2004), we assume firms' detailing policies are functions of physician char-
, and d c (z p ) denote the detailing policies for Viagra, Levitra, and Cialis, respectively. 6 We also assume physicians have rational expectations regarding future detailing, which implies they know the detailing policy functions.
Given expectations of drug qualities and future detailing and realizations of persuasive detailing n pt = (n pvt , n plt , n pct ) and ε p , a physician chooses an action a pt ∈ {v, l, c} to maximize expected discounted utility from the current and future patients. The physician's decision rule is therefore a mapping
With the finite action space, an optimal decision rule exists and max-
where δ is the daily discount rate and ∆ p is the number of days between patients for physician p, yielding a discount factor of β p = exp(−δ∆ p ). The higher discount factor of physicians with more patients (i.e., lower ∆ p ) provides a greater incentive for them to experiment with new drugs to obtain information relevant for future patients. We assume an infinite horizon because no deterministic final period exists (Ackerberg 2003 ).
The Bellman equation for the recursive formulation of physician p's dynamic optimization is
= max
where t and p subscripts have been omitted and denotes next-period values.
The second line in the Bellman equation reflects several specifics regarding the transition of state variables, as governed by f , h, and g. First, z = z because z is constant over time. Second, the transition of beliefs to x is independent of ε, ε , n, and n v because they are uninformative about drug efficacies themselves and influence neither the detailing of the new drugs nor the patient feedback. Finally, the transition to n depends on firms' detailing policies, which we assume are functions of z only. The transition to n is therefore independent of current and continuation values of the other state variables.
Following Rust (1987) , we integrate over ε in the Bellman equation to obtain the integrated value function, which represents the physician's expected discounted utility prior to observing the current period's ε. Given the similarity of Levitra to Viagra, we expect their ε to be correlated, and therefore assume ε is distributed generalized extreme value (shifted to have a mean of zero). That is, we specify a nested logit model with Viagra and Levitra in one nest and Cialis in another:
where ρ = 1 yields the standard logit with independent utilities. Note thatQ j isQ pjt after omitting the p and t subscripts. In the data, detailing counts between patient visits have means that match their variances. We therefore model detailing expectations using the Poisson distribution. We estimate these densities in a first stage, as discussed in the next section.
To evaluate the integral in the continuation value of equation 7, we consider n j ∈ {0, 1, 2, E(n j |n j ≥ 3)} for each drug's detailing levels. 7 For each set of (n v , n l , n c ), we use the tensor product of five Gauss-Hermite nodes to integrate over the signals D l , D c , and
We assume the persuasive effect of detailing depends only on whether n j > 0, which implies s(n jpt ; α p ) = α p I(n jpt > 0). 8 We can then replace the 3-tuple (n v , n l , n c ) in the state space with the 3-tuple n >0 = (I(n v > 0), I(n l > 0), I(n c > 0)), which takes one of eight values.
We compute EV p using value function iteration with multidimensional linear interpolation to evaluate points not on our discretized grid for the four continuous state
Qc ). Figure 5 depicts the monotonic relationship between EV p and mean beliefs, both with and without uncertainty. The figure depicts the relationship for Levitra, holding fixed p's beliefs for Cialis (atQ pct = −4 and σ Qpct = 0) and levels of detailing (at n pt = 0). Uncertainty has a negligible effect on the value function when beliefs are sufficiently low or high that the choice probability is nearly zero or one for all probable realizations of true quality. The option value of uncertainty, represented by the difference in the value functions with and without uncertainty, is maximized at a moderate level of mean beliefs near zero. Without uncertainty, the choice probability is essentially .5 when Q plt = 0 (given Q pvt = 0 andQ pct = −4). With uncertainty, the realized true quality will therefore have the greatest expected impact on choice probabilities when the expected distribution of true quality is centered around zero.
Estimation
We estimate the model in two stages. In the first stage, we estimate firms' detailing policies toward physicians using a Poisson model that conditions on z p . We then estimate the remaining parameters, denoted θ, using the nested fixed-point approach of Rust (1987) .
For patient visits that precede the launch of Cialis, we assume physicians do not anticipate the entry of Cialis. That is, for these patients, physicians' policy functions maximize the expected discounted value from prescribing either Viagra or Levitra through perpetuity.
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We account for heterogeneity across physicians using observable characteristics z j and the unobserved true efficacies Q pl and Q pc , which we assume are distributed nor-
Qc ), respectively. 10 We allow physicians' initial beliefs to be incorrect by specifying initial beliefs asQ pj0 ∼ N (Q pj +Q j0 , σ 2 j0 ) for j ∈ {l, c}. This specification allows physicians to initially be wrong, on average, byQ j0 while also allowing physicians with higher true efficacies Q pj to have, on average, higher initial beliefs. We follow Narayanan, Chintagunta, and Miravete (2007) by fixing σ We construct z j to account for two physician characteristics: patient-base size (P B j ) and detailing frequency for each drug (DF pj ). P B p is the number of ED patient visits to physician p during our estimation sample. DF pj is the average number of drug j detailings between patient visits for physician p. In the absence of computational constraints, we would condition physicians' expectations regarding future patient visits and 9 If physicians anticipate Cialis' entry, the time until its entry becomes an additional state variable, and a finite-horizon solution method must be used with continuation values in the final period before Cialis's entry being derived from the value function in equation 6.
10 Allowing the persuasive effect of detailing to vary across physicians did not yield a statistically significant improvement in the fit of the myopic model, so we assume homogeneous persuasive effects in the dynamic model. detailing directly on P B p and DF pj . However, computing EV p for each combination of (P B p , DF pv , DF pl , DF pc ) is prohibitive. We therefore segment physicians according to three levels of P B j and three levels of DF pv + DF pl + DF pc , yielding nine observable physician segments.
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We first segment consumers according to whether they have three or fewer new patient visits, four to eight new patient visits, or more than eight new patient visits during the estimation period. We define a vector of patient-base-size dummy variables P B p = (P B small,p , P B medium,p , P B large,p ) to capture this physician characteristic. We then characterize each physician according to whether DF pv +DF pl +DF pc is in the low, middle, or top third among physicians with the same patient-base size. Let the vector of dummy
For each segment (P B, D), we estimate drug j's Poisson parameter λ j (P B, D) as the average DF pj among physicians in segment (P B, D):
By assuming each physician knows the segment to which he belongs and knows that segment's λ j for each drug, we impose the assumption that physician's have rational expectations regarding future detailing.
We report characteristics of each segment and the λ j estimates, with standard errors, in Table 2 . The λ j estimates range from .104 to 4.221, revealing substantial variation across physicians in actual and expected detailing. The λ j estimates are precise, as revealed by the standard errors being low relative to the λ j estimates themselves. We also report the variance of DF j across physicians within each segment. These variances are remarkably close to the λ j estimates, which supports our choice of the Poisson distribution 11 The DF pj are highly correlated across drugs, which prompts our segmenting physicians based on DF pv + DF pl + DF pc . Segmenting physicians based on detailing for each drug individually expands the state space with little benefit because few physicians would be in segments characterized by low detailing in one drug and high detailing in the others.
to model detailing expectations. The reported discount factors β p , which range from .9413 to .9934, are defined as exp(−δ∆ p ) using a daily discount rate of δ = .2/365 and the ∆ p reported in column 3.
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Given EV p , the probability that physician p chooses drug j at time t conditional on his state (x pt , z p , n >0 pt ) is
where
is the conditional value function-the expected discounted utility, net of ε pjt , if j is chosen (i.e., a pt = j). For each candidate θ, we compute EV p assuming physicians' detailing beliefs are accurately represented by the estimated count models. To efficiently compute the choice probability in equation 9, for each (z p , n , the simulated likelihood for his T p patient visits is
where a pt ∈ {v, l, c} is p's choice in period t. We do not face an initial conditions problem regarding physicians' beliefs, because our panel begins prior to the launches of Levitra and Cialis and the efficacy of the incumbent Viagra is known.
We use the simulated maximum likelihood estimator defined bŷ
Narayanan and Manchanda (2009) provide a detailed discussion of the parameters of the myopic version of a similar model using the same data we do. We therefore refer the interested reader to that paper for a description of the features of our data that facilitate identification.
Results
Given the discount factors β p and the detailing expectations λ j in Table 2 , we estimate the model using 621 randomly selected physicians from among the 957 available. The loglikelihood of the dynamic model with forward-looking consumers is −4567.45, compared to −4581.63 when we assume physicians are myopic with β p = 0 for all p. Since the data reject the myopic model, we only present and discuss estimates of the dynamic model with forward-looking physicians.
Parameter Estimates
In Table 3 , we provide the estimates and standard errors of the structural parameters.
The estimated biases in initial priors,Q l0 = −1.61 andQ c0 − 2.99, indicate physicians were initially pessimistic about both new drugs' true efficacies. These low initial beliefs are consistent with the low initial sales for both Levitra and Cialis.
Levitra's estimated average efficacy Q l is slightly below Viagra's normalized value of zero, whereas the average efficacy of Cialis Q c is higher than zero. These quality rankings accord with the firms' long-run market shares: Cialis became the leader, with Viagra retaining the number-two position. 13 The dispersion in efficacy across physicians is greater for Cialis (σ Qc = .86) than for Levitra (σ Q l = .49). This result is consistent with Levitra and Viagra being chemically more similar than Cialis and Viagra, because Q lp and Q cp are measured relative to Viagra for each physician.
As physicians gained information from detailing and patient feedback, they revised their beliefs upwards and began prescribing Cialis and Levitra more often. The precisions of the information signals govern the rate at which physicians modify their beliefs and consequent behavior. Detailing signals from Levitra are more informative than detailing signals from Cialis: σ D l = .5 compared to σ Dc = .97. This finding perhaps reflects the relative ease of informing a physician that Levitra is similar to the incumbent Viagra, compared to the challenge of explaining differences between Cialis and Viagra. The patient feedback signal for Cialis, however, is more precise than for Levitra: σ Rc = .42 versus
We estimate the persuasive effect of detailing to be .22, which exceeds the average quality difference between Cialis and Viagra and is nearly as large as the average quality difference between Cialis and Levitra. To assess whether detailing by Levitra and Cialis is indeed informative, we perform a likelihood ratio test of the restriction σ D l = σ Dc = ∞.
The −4681.07 log-likelihood of the restricted model yields a test statistic of 2×(4681.07− 4567.45) = 227.23, which exceeds the chi-square .01 critical value of 9.21. We therefore reject the model with uninformative detailing.
Finally, the estimate of ρ = .56 implies Viagra and Levitra indeed have correlated utilities and are appropriately modeled as being in the same nest.
Detailing Elasticities
To assess the managerial implications of differences between static and dynamic models and the role of detailing expectations, we check how physician prescription behavior changes in response to changes in firms' detailing policies.
We first simulate physician's choices when each firm's detailing activities between patient visits are simulated using the Poisson model with mean counts given by the estimates of λ j from equation 8 and presented in Table 2 . To compute the detailing elasticity for firm j, we inflate λ j by 10 percent and re-simulate physicians' choices with the higher simulated detailing activity of firm j. with the higher detailing activity. These two scenarios bound the elasticities derived from a process in which physicians infer changes in detailing policies from observed activity.
We present the detailing elasticities for Levitra and Cialis in Table 4 . The top half presents the effect of detailing on physician behavior with a physician's first patient after the respective drug's launch. We refer to this measure as the short-run elasticity.
The bottom half presents the long-run elasticity by measuring the effect of detailing on prescriptions written for all post-launch patients in our sample.
For comparison, we also report elasticities if physicians were myopic, obtained by setting all β p to 0. The myopic elasticities are more than twice as large as the elasticities with forward-looking physicians, because initial beliefs are pessimistic and myopic consumers are not willing to sacrifice current utility to obtain information. The information myopic physicians receive therefore has a bigger effect on their choices: without raising their pessimistic beliefs the myopic physicians have low prescription rates.
As reported in the last column of Table 4 , detailing elasticities are 8.6 to 15.2 percent
higher when E(DF pj ) are fixed. When physicians anticipate an increase in detailing, they lower their willingness to sacrifice current utility to obtain information through patient feedback, because they expect an increased flow of free information from detailing. This substitution lowers the effect of detailing on prescription choices.
The short-run elasticities are higher than the long-run elasticities because in the short run, the informative effect of detailing is high as physicians initially have pessimistic beliefs. In the long run, physicians' beliefs are more accurate, which reduces the informative effect of detailing.
The elasticities are higher for Cialis because the informative effect of detailing is greater for Cialis than for Levitra, given Cialis's greater degree of initial pessimism. Evidently, this more pronounced pessimism for Cialis swamps the lower precision of the drug's detailing signals.
Finally, we note these elasticities ignore possible category expansion resulting from more detailing activity. Our model of prescription choice does not have an outside good because we do not observe the set of patients with ED-like conditions who choose alternative remedies. If many of these patients could be converted to Cialis or Levitra users, the elasticities could be substantially higher. The lack of over-the-counter treatments for ED, however, suggests the set of ED patients who do not use one of these three drugs is small.
Conditional Choice Probabilities
To assess the effect of forward-looking behavior and substitution of detailing information for patient feedback, we compute conditional choice probabilities at various states. Figure 6 presents the probability of prescribing Levitra as a function of uncertainty about its efficacy. The higher set of probabilities correspond to the physician having mean beliefs near Levitra's true efficacy whereas the lower set assumes the physician's mean belief is lower, at −1.4. We fix beliefs about Cialis's efficacy atQ pc = −3 and σ Qpc = 0 and fix the persuasive effect state variables such that no firm has detailed the physician since the previous patient.
Forward-looking physicians prescribe Levitra with a higher probability than myopic physicians because of the value of the patient feedback. However, this increase in prescription rates is nearly eliminated when physicians expect high detailing, because physicians in the model substitute free information from future detailing for costly information from patient feedback. When low detailing is expected, the prescription rates are higher than when high detailing is expected, but remain much lower than when no detailing is expected. This implication of the model is consistent with the empirical evidence of delayed adoption by physicians expecting high future detailing, as presented in Table 1 .
Profit-maximizing Detailing Intensity
Using the estimated dynamic model, we conduct a counterfactual analysis to assess the optimality of Levitra's and Cialis's detailing intensities. We unilaterally rescale λ l and λ c by factors ranging from .5 to 2.0 by .1 and plot in Figure 7 the implied profits for each detailing intensity, assuming competitors' detailing levels are fixed.
We assume manufacturing costs are negligible and estimate revenues per prescription of $76.16 and $98.74, respectively, for Levitra and Cialis, using total revenues and total prescriptions, obtained from IMS Health's New Product Spectra data. These data also provide total detailing costs and detailing visits, which enables us to estimate detailing costs per visit of $97.07 and $118.20, respectively, for Levitra and Cialis. We compute profits for each detailing level under two scenarios: assuming physicians have rational expectations of detailing intensity and assuming physicians expect the detailing levels observed in the data.
Detailing is inherently an investment with payoffs that extend into the future. We simulate physicians' choices during our sample's post-launch months for Levitra and Cialis, and scale the sales by a customer lifetime value (LTV) factor. That is, the LTV factor provides the number of prescriptions over the lifetime of each new patient acquired during these first several post-launch months. As depicted by the solid line in the bottom panel of Figure 7 , we find a LTV factor around 25 yields the actual detailing intensity of Cialis as profit maximizing when physicians anticipate changes to detailing levels. In the top panel, an LTV of 25 implies Levitra provided too much detailing. An LTV around 33
(not presented), yields a maximum profit for Levitra at its observed detailing levels.
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Comparing the solid lines to the dashed lines in Figure 7 reveals that the profitmaximizing level of detailing is lower when physicians have rational expectations regarding detailing than when expectations are fixed. The lower optimal detailing reflects the need for firms to account for the increased incentives for physicians to wait for free information (or samples) from detailing when such detailing is more frequent. This result succinctly illustrates the main point of our paper.
Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the role of physicians' forward-looking behavior and expectations of future detailing on the diffusion of two new prescription drugs in the ED category.
We first provide empirical evidence that suggests physicians delay adoption of the new 15 Levitra's profits per physician exceed those of Cialis primarily because Levitra launched two months prior to Cialis. drugs when they expect several visits from sales representatives in the future. Such delay may reflect strategic substitution between learning from detailing and learning from patient feedback, or alternatively, waiting for free samples from the sales representatives.
We then estimate a dynamic Bayesian learning model that can replicate these features of the data.
We structurally estimate the true mean efficacies of the two new drugs, physicians' initial beliefs about these efficacies, the informative effect and the relative importance in physicians' learning of both patient feedback and each firm's detailing, and the persuasive impact of detailing. Estimation results from the dynamic model indicate physicians initially view the new drugs as inferior to Viagra but revise their beliefs upwards as they learn Cialis is the most effective one and Levitra nearly as effective as Viagra. The similarity in the chemical makeup of Levitra and Viagra imply Levitra and Viagra are viewed as closer substitutes for each other than for Cialis. Learning from patient feedback and detailing are estimated to be similarly effective for Levitra, whereas learning from feedback is more effective than detailing for Cialis.
Turning to managerial implications, we show that increased detailing sets two opposing forces in motion. First, physicians obtain information faster and therefore tend to adopt sooner, assuming the information is on average favorable, as in our case with priors below the true efficacies. Second, if physicians expect more future detailing, they are more likely to wait for free information from the expected detailing than to experiment with patients to obtain feedback. This latter effect, which the literature had not yet identified, can lower detailing elasticities by 8 to 13 percent.
We also evaluate the optimality of Levitra's and Cialis's detailing intensities during the first several months following their respective launches. We find the observed intensity for Cialis was optimal if each prescription written during our sample translates into about 24 additional prescriptions in the future. For Levitra, the observed detailing intensity maximizes profits if each prescription translates into 32 future prescriptions.
A natural next step is to fully solve for firms' optimal detailing strategies given physician's forward-looking behavior and substitution across detailing and experimentation sources of information. We leave such an investigation to future work. Elasticities are computed using the estimated dynamic model. The myopic case sets β = 0. Baseline detailing activity is simulated using the λ j values reported in Table 2 . Counterfactual detailing activity is simulated using λ j values scaled by 1.1.
With fixed detailing expectations (column 2), physicians' EV p are unchanged.
With updated detailing expectations (column 3), physicians' EV p are recomputed using the higher λ j . To illustrate the effect of Levitra's mean belief and uncertainty on the value function, we plot EV p holding fixedQ pct = −4, σ Qpct = 0, and n vpt = n lpt = n cpt = 0. Other detailing levels and values for Cialis's beliefs yield similar plots. With forward-looking physicians the model's implied probability of prescribing Levitra increases in the level of uncertainty σ Q pl and mean beliefsQ pl . Expected detailing decreases the effect of uncertainty on the choice probability. For these plots, we fix beliefs about Cialis and assume the physician has not been detailed by any firm since the previous patient. 
